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y title is “The Emergence of
the American Constitutional
Law Tradition,” and what I
want us to think about today
is the process by which American constitutional law came to be what it is in
2018. Now that’s a long, complicated
story, and all I can do is give you a few
outtakes from what is a much broader
book project. I’m going to summarize
some specific stories from the overall
narrative, and hope to give you a sense
of how the big story hangs together.
Before I begin, however, I want to
say something about the word “tradition.” By tradition we often mean
some practice that a particular group
or community engages in over time. In
my maternal grandparents’ family, it is
a tradition to eat celery stalks stuffed
with homemade pimento cheese on
Thanksgiving. I don’t know when the
Carters began doing so — but it’s something we do: If the people you’re dining
with on Thanksgiving don’t have a
plate full of celery and pimento cheese,
they’re probably not Carters. Repeating
this little tradition year after year is an
identifying mark of my family.
Intellectual traditions differ in the
way they cohere over time. As the
great philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre
said years ago, a tradition of rational
inquiry does not maintain its continuity through the simple repetition of
what has been thought and said in the
past. What gives life to such a tradition is not so much agreement about
answers as it is agreement about
questions. In MacIntyre’s words, an
intellectual “tradition is an argument extended through time in which
[even its] fundamental agreements
are defined and redefined . . . [through]
conflict.”1 An intellectual tradition,
unless it goes dead, is a continuity of
conflict, and debate and disagreement
are its lifeblood. The emergence of the

American constitutional law tradition,
then, is the story of an ongoing debate,
an endless argument over, among
other things, what constitutional law
is about.
One other thing: Let me tell you up
front my hidden agenda. First, I want
you to be optimistic and also anxious
about the health of our constitutional
law tradition. We’re living in a time
of deep constitutional division, but
severe disagreement is nothing new,
and raucous debate is a sign of health,
not decay. But at the same time, the
tradition will not maintain itself: It
depends on our commitment to carry
on our debates in good faith, to recognize whenever possible the good faith
of those with whom we disagree, and
to resist the perennial temptation to
convert constitutional law into a mere
tool of ideological warfare. And second? I hope to persuade some of you
that the study of our constitutional
law’s past for its own sake is endlessly
fascinating, quite apart from any value
it may have in present-day debates.
Now, let me take you back to the
very beginning of the American
constitutional law tradition. It’s
somewhat artificial to choose a specific year, and even more a specific day,
as the beginning of any great intellectual tradition: They don’t spring fully
formed from the forehead of Zeus;
they take shape gradually. That said,
I feel confident that few lawyers in
this room will question the date I’ve
chosen to begin my story. After all, an
obvious starting point for our tradition is Feb. 7, 1292.
Perhaps there’s someone here who’s
not a lawyer, and I should say a bit about
the significance of Feb. 7, 1292. It was
on that day that King Edward I commissioned William de Bereford as a judge
on the Court of Common Pleas, thus u
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setting in motion the intellectual and
institutional developments that eventually lead to American constitutional
law in 2018.2 Bereford himself is a
fascinating character: He came from a
modest family in the English midlands,
and he declined to pursue a career
in the church or in the king’s household, the only options for a brainy and
ambitious young man without means.
Instead, Bereford somehow managed
to worm his way into the small group
of non-clerics who in the 1270s and ’80s
were coalescing as full-time advocates
in the Court of Common Pleas. By the
late 1280s, Bereford was what a modern scholar called “the Common Bench
specialist par excellence,” and the king
himself had retained Bereford in several cases.3 Appointing this familiar,
skilled, and no doubt reliable legal
henchman to the court likely seemed
a safe choice to Edward and his advisors, but putting Bereford on the bench
would have repercussions the king
could never have guessed.
For one thing, Bereford was one
of the first royal judges chosen for
his professional skills and accomplishments in the law. Before him,
appointment to a royal court almost
always went to a senior government
bureaucrat, often a churchman: Such
judges came to the bench with little
knowledge of legal procedure and no
personal interest in expanding the role
of the courts in government. Bereford
was a judge of a different ilk: He owed
his elevation to his mastery of the law,
and his interests and his judgments
were shaped by professional pride and
expertise. His appointment was a successful experiment. After him, almost
all royal judges had backgrounds similar to his, and the judiciary quickly
became the preserve of an autonomous profession, rather than a branch
of the church or the bureaucracy.4
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y Bereford’s
death, what
were originally
personal duties
owed between
specific individuals
were well on their
way to becoming
obligations running
with the land itself,
and ownership
was increasingly
determined by legal
rules and the market
rather than heredity.
This was no accident.

Perhaps this would not have mattered so much if William de Bereford
had been a different character or his
appointment had occurred in a different era, but, at times, history is shaped
by the accidental convergence of the
personal and the societal. Bereford was
a self-confident and forceful individual,
politically shrewd and utterly convinced that it was lawyers who ought
to say what the law is. He was longlived as well, and served for almost 34
years, half of the time as chief justice.
By the time he died, no common law
judge or advocate knew any vision of
law but Bereford’s.
Of equal importance, Bereford was
given the opportunity to shape bench
and bar in a time of great legal ferment. King Edward I was later named
the English Justinian because it was in
his reign, and that of his son Edward II,
that the common law of the realm was

overhauled root and branch and began
to assume its developed medieval
and early modern form.5 For the first
Edward’s first 20 years, legal reform
was centered in the high Court of
Parliament. The dominant judicial body
was the Court of King’s Bench, and
the clerks in the royal Chancery held
a tight grip on what cases the royal
courts could and could not hear. By the
time Chief Justice Bereford died, all of
this was in the process of transformation: The initiative for legal change
now lay in the Court of Common Pleas,
the authority of King’s Bench to review
Common Pleas decisions was largely a
dead letter, and Bereford had wrested
effective control over his court’s jurisdiction from Chancery. Bereford was,
in short, the first great practitioner of
what later became a legal maxim, “It is
the duty of a good judge to expand his
jurisdiction.”6
But to what end, you ask? What
was Chief Justice Bereford trying to
accomplish in expanding his court’s
authority? The Yearbooks — those marvelous but often perplexing records of
legal argument in the medieval courts
that begin their regular appearance
under Bereford — give us no clear
answer, though they give many examples of his wit and his quick temper.
But if you examine his patterns of
commentary and judgment, you begin
to see overarching themes. Let me give
you a couple of examples.
The law of real property before
Bereford was largely a description
of the personal, political, and constitutional relationships among the
Crown, its great noble vassals, their
lesser tenants, and so on. By Bereford’s
death, what were originally personal
duties owed between specific individuals were well on their way to
becoming obligations running with
the land itself, and ownership was
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increasingly determined by legal rules
and the market rather than heredity.7 This was no accident: As Bereford
said in a 1320 case enforcing a bargain
concerning land, the decision rested in
part on the existence of a quid pro quo,
“there [was here] one thing in return
for another, for which principle we
have great regard.”8
Again, Bereford usually insisted that
litigants and their lawyers turn square
corners in satisfying the law’s technical requirements. But he detested
attempts to use legal technicalities
to achieve unfair advantage. In a 1310
case, Bereford exploded when a defendant invoked a trivial pleading error in
order to avoid a clear duty to pay half
the plaintiff’s loss: “Reason requires
that you [pay], and the law is founded
on reason, and good faith demands it.
You want to have the eggs and the half
penny too.”9 (By the way, according to
one historian, a half penny would buy a
dozen eggs about this time.10)
By and large, the changes Bereford
and his colleagues effected in the law
are ones most of us would think desirable. But Bereford’s central importance
for our story lies elsewhere, in the style
of judicial personality he bequeathed
the common law, and ultimately
American constitutional law.
Our tradition is not the product
of anonymous bureaucrats, but the
creation in large measure of strongminded and strong-willed judges
prepared to use their creativity to
reshape the law. Think of the truly
influential constitutional judges in
U.S. history from John Marshall and
Joseph Story to William Brennan and
William Rehnquist. They were all heirs
of William de Bereford in their willingness to exercise power. We can say of
each what Justice Benjamin Cardozo
wrote about Chief Justice Marshall:
He “gave to the Constitution . . . the
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impress of his own mind . . . [so that]
our constitutional law is what it is,
because he moulded it . . . in the fire of
his own intense convictions.”11
And thereon hangs the other side of
Chief Justice Bereford’s legacy to us.
That he, and his American heirs, have
acted out of intense conviction, I have
no doubt. But was it right for him, or
for them, to do so? What is and what
should be the relationship between the
judge’s personal convictions and the
“law” supposedly being expounded?
Bereford upended many of England’s
previous constitutional arrangements,
and he often did so by strained readings of Parliament’s acts, by ignoring
common law rules that were in his way,
and by finding means to circumvent the
limitations on his court’s authority. All
of this should sound familiar: American
constitutional law has been deeply
shaped by the exercise of judicial power
in the Bereford style by judges cast in
the Bereford mold . . . and one of our
central debates has been over how to
ensure that the exercise of such power
by such judges is legitimate.
This problem of legitimacy is not
a modern or American discovery.
Eighteen years after Bereford died,
the Court of Common Pleas heard a
case, Flaundres v. Rychman, in which
the plaintiff’s lawyer invoked a
Bereford decision. When one of the
judges sounded doubtful, the lawyer
insisted. “I think you will do as others
have done in the same case, or else we
do not know what the law is.” Justice
Roger Hillary, the first known Legal
Realist, answered: “[Law] is the will of
the Justices.” To which Chief Justice
John Stonor immediately replied —
and I will quote the law French since I
took a course in that bizarre language
years ago and seldom get to mispronounce it: “Nanyl, ley est resoun.”

“Nonsense! [it’s an emphatic negative],
law is reason.”12
Resoun in law French is sometimes
best translated by a phrase like “what
makes sense” or “what is in fact truly
just,” and Stonor was, I think, taking a step beyond Bereford’s dislike
for the use of technicalities employed
to achieve unjust ends. Over the next
three centuries, this idea that law is
reason was fleshed out, and it was
another chief justice of Common Pleas,
Sir Edward Coke, who gave the equation its canonical formulation.13 In
November 1608, King James I convened
a meeting at Westminster of judges and
other high officials: James was unhappy
about the Common Pleas interfering
with the work of commissions exercising the king’s personal prerogative and
wanted to rein Coke in.14 In the course
of the discussion, James commented
that if law is reason, then he himself
— being a reasonable and learned king
— was perfectly competent to make
legal decisions or delegate them to his
political councilors. Coke tried to find a
polite way to say no:
[T]rue it is that God has endowed
your Majesty with excellent Science
and great endowments of nature,
but your Majesty is not learned
in the Lawes of your Realme of
England, and causes which concern
the life, or inheritance, or goods
of your Subjects . . . are not to be
decided by naturall reasoning but
by the artificiall reason and judgment of Law . . . which requires long
study and experience.
The authority of the courts over
political actors, in other words, stems
from the judges’ intellectual immersion
in the tradition of legal thought. Even
when the law requires judges to give
effect to an act of Parliament or of the
monarch, such political acts must enter
the domain of law governed by the u
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judges’ reasoned judgment before they
can rightly touch the “life or inheritance or goods” of the individual. It’s
a bold and indeed breathtaking claim
about the authority of legal reason, and
the scope of judicial authority, and it is
one that underlies virtually all of modern American constitutional law.
King James was not amused. Indeed,
he was enraged by what he called “treason,” and Coke only barely escaped a
cell in the Tower of London. But the
episode had no effect on Coke’s behavior as a judge, and Anglo-American
lawyers have long cited it as an important milestone in the history of the rule
of law: For all the king’s bluster, it was
Coke and the common law that had the
last laugh. It’s a great tale, and more or
less true. But of equal importance for
our story is what the king actually said.
James didn’t simply lose his temper:
He also delivered a shrewd counter to
Coke’s argument.
If the judges interprete the lawes
themselves, and suffer none else
to interprete, then they may easily
make of the laws shipmens hose.15
I don’t know why the king thought of
sailors’ socks, but his point is clear: If,
as Coke claimed, it is the province and
duty of the courts alone to say what the
law is, there is no institutional check
on the judges. Neither legal texts,
which clever construction can leave as
flexible as a stocking, nor the forms of
legal reason, which the courts themselves define, can prevent a supremacy
not of law, but of lawyers — and, above
all, judges.
The distinguished legal historian
William Holdsworth once wrote that
the U.S. Supreme Court embodies
“Coke’s ideal of the supremacy of the
law.”16 Precisely because that is true,
the American constitutional law tradition continues to wrestle with King
James’s objection: that to legitimate
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f, as Coke
claimed, it is
the province
and duty of the courts
alone to say what
the law is, there is no
institutional check on
the judges. Neither
legal texts, which
clever construction
can leave as flexible
as a stocking, nor the
forms of legal reason,
which the courts
themselves define,
can prevent a
supremacy not of
law, but of lawyers —
and, above all, judges.
judicial decision by judicial reasoning is
viciously circular, and that a court acting on Coke’s ideal is free to assume an
illegitimate political role at will.
Now let me bring you forward
not quite two centuries and across
the Atlantic to Washington, D.C.
It is the winter of 1800–1801, and the
infant United States is in a constitutional crisis, a crisis of constitutional
politics rather than constitutional law.
It’s become clear that both the House
and the Senate in the next federal
Congress will have Republican majorities, and that the current president,
Federalist John Adams, will not keep
his office barring some sort of political
coup d’etat. It’s quite unclear who will
become president, since the pre-12th

Amendment electoral college arrangements have produced a tie between
two Republicans. And in the meantime
and up to the beginning of March, the
old Federalist-controlled Congress is
sitting, Adams is still president, and
the defeated Federalists have one last
window of opportunity to wield power.
The story by which the crisis was
surmounted and Jefferson became
president is no doubt familiar.17 I
want us to focus instead on a different
aspect of that winter’s events. On Dec.
22, 1800, a Republican congressman,
Thomas Davis, gave a speech in which
he smugly warned his Federalist colleagues that political time was running
out on them: “The sun of Federalism is
nearly set — not three months, and it
sets forever.”18 Davis’s image apparently hit a nerve, and the Federalists
repeatedly brought it up to rebut it.
But the rhetorical argument over the
twilight of Federalism took a new turn
the following month, as the House
debated a bill to re-authorize the
Sedition Act of 1798.
On Jan. 21, Federalist Jonas Platt
reminded the House of Davis’s sunset
imagery and “confessed that he viewed
with horror the awful night that would
follow.”19 Platt quickly made it clear
that he and other Federalists dreaded
the Republican triumph not only for
its immediate political ramifications,
but also for what it implied about
the future of the Constitution itself.
Congress was the central locus for federal constitutional debate at first, and,
over the previous 12 years, the emergence of Federalists and Republicans as
partisan political factions in Congress
was paralleled by the emergence of
two distinct approaches to constitutional argument. Republicans generally
insisted on construing the Constitution
with painstaking adherence to its precise wording and literal meaning.
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James Madison’s great speech against
the national bank bill in February 1791
offered a dense list of “rules” of interpretation emphasizing the duty to
obey “the natural and obvious force of
the terms and the context” of particular constitutional provisions.20 Other
Republicans took even more stringent views: As Stevens Mason put it
in a later debate, “[n]ot only sentences,
but words, and even [punctuation]
points elucidate its meaning,” and the
elucidation of the text’s meaning is
constitutional law.21
In contrast, the Federalists, in that
long first decade, regularly denounced
Republican textualism as a betrayal
of the written Constitution. Rising to
answer Madison’s attack on the bank
bill, the great Federalist Fisher Ames
mocked Madison’s arguments:
I never suspected that the objections I have heard stated had
existence; I consider them as
discoveries [that] the acute penetration of that gentleman [has]
brought . . . to light.
Sarcasm to one side, according to
Ames, Madison’s textualism was a
radical mistake. Contrary to Madison,
dogmatic “rules” about how to interpret the Constitution were quite
incapable of ensuring correct constitutional answers. Madison’s attempts
to parse its words “will be found
as obscure [as the arguments he]
condemn[s]; they only set up one construction against another.”22
For Ames, and for the Federalists
generally, fidelity to the Constitution
lay in adherence to the Constitution’s
purposes rather than its precise
wording. “That construction may be
maintained to be a safe one which promotes the good of the society, and the
ends for which the Government was
adopted.”23 As someone else put it, “the
boundaries of the Constitution cannot
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be laid down with mathematical precision, by the square and compass. They
must be ascertained by . . . the exercise
of discretion.”24 Congressman Platt
was mourning not just a defeat on the
level of power and policy, but a deeper
tragedy: the Constitution’s transformation from a coherent instrument of
governance into a grab bag of separate
clauses for lawyers to quibble over.
It’s important to understand what
was actually at stake in the winter of
1800 and 1801. There was of course a
political and partisan dimension to the
debate over constitutional method:
Federalist discretion conveniently
legitimated their legislative program,
while Republican textualism happily
vindicated their general opposition to
Federalist legislation. But the debate
over constitutional method was not
simply a matter of political expedience. It also reflected principled
concerns, on the part of both factions,
about the capacity of Lord Coke’s “artificiall Reason and judgment of Law”
to reach legitimate decisions under
the Constitution. Republicans were
echoing King James’s fear that professional legal reason is the tool by which
legal insiders can circumvent written limits on their power. Federalists,
for their part, thought that most constitutional difficulties “arise from a
narrow, technical, lawyer-like view
of the Constitution” at odds with “the
great national purposes for which the
Constitution was adopted.”25
If our constitutional law tradition
had followed either set of fears, in 2018
it might not really be a legal tradition at
all. Strict textualism can produce rampant disregard for the too-strict textual
limits on power: As one congressman
said, the text “will be habitually broken
whenever the pressure of events shall
seem to require.”26 A thorough-going emphasis on purpose, on the other

hand, tends to reduce constitutional
questions to straightforward questions of policy: The Constitution, as
a senator once asserted, “is one eternal now” and authorizes whatever
seems “necessary and proper” to do
“this day.”27
Our tradition went neither of these
paths, and one of the reasons goes
back to that fateful winter. The day
before Congressman Platt bemoaned
the sunset of Federalism, President
Adams nominated his secretary of
state, John Marshall, to be chief justice.
The Federalist majority in the Senate
made no public objection, but, behind
closed doors, many Federalist leaders
were disappointed. Marshall’s political heart was in the right place, most of
them conceded, but constitutionally he
was all too similar to his cousin Thomas
Jefferson, another nit-picking Southern
lawyer. After meeting Marshall, Oliver
Wolcott wrote Ames that
Marshall . . . is doubtless a man
of virtue . . . but he will think too
much of the State of Virginia, and
is too much disposed to govern
the world according to rules of
logic; he will read and expound the
Constitution as if it were a penal
statute, and will sometimes be
embarrassed with doubts of which
his friends will not perceive the
importance.
Ames was less indulgent: “False
Federalists or such as act wrong from
false fears should be dealt hardly with,
if I were Jupiter the Thunderer.”28 But
he kept quiet too, and Marshall was
quickly confirmed.
Ames, who died in 1808, doubtless went to his grave thinking he had
been right about Marshall. In a series
of early, mostly forgotten decisions — I
have in mind such headliners as Clarke
v. Bazadone and Hepburn v. Ellzey29 —
Marshall led the Court in reaching u
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constitutional decisions by carefully
textual means, but, as time passed, it
became clear that Marshall was no
Jefferson, and no Fisher Ames either.
He and his allies stood, rather, in the
tradition of Lord Coke and sought to
answer constitutional questions by
applying what Marshall called “that
great paramount law of reason, which
pervades and regulates all human systems,” while observing the American
principle that the written Constitution
is “a rule for the government of
courts, as well as of the legislature.”30
Constitutional law is reason, reason
operating to give reasonable effect to
the written supreme law. The underlying intellectual structure of American
constitutional law in 2018 descends
in lineal succession from the common law of Chief Justice Coke in no
small measure because Chief Justice
Marshall made it so. And, as a consequence, our tradition is also a debate
over the extent to which the Supreme
Court has been guilty of the sins about
which King James warned us.
My last story begins a few years
before the winter of 1800 and 1801,
in 1793 on the ground floor of the
Philadelphia City Hall, where the
Supreme Court of the United States is
announcing its first substantive decision, Chisholm v. Georgia.31 By a four to
one vote, the justices have concluded
that the Court has original jurisdiction
over a contract action brought by a
South Carolina citizen against the state
of Georgia, but our concern today is not
with the decision itself; instead, I want
us to think about a single line in Chief
Justice John Jay’s seriatim opinion.
In Jay’s view, the only important
objection to the Court’s jurisdiction
lay in the idea that Georgia as a sovereign enjoyed immunity from suit, and
Jay thought the answer to that objec-
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tion obvious: The idea of sovereign
immunity has no place in American
constitutional law. As the term itself
suggests, Jay explained, sovereign
immunity stems from “feudal principles, [a political] system [that] considers
the Prince as the sovereign, and the
people as his subjects.”
No such ideas obtain here; at
the Revolution, the sovereignty
devolved on the people; and they
are truly the sovereigns of the
country, but they are sovereigns
without subjects . . . and have none
to govern but themselves; the citizens of America are equal . . . as
joint tenants in the sovereignty. . . .
[and t]he attention and attachment
of the Constitution to the equal
rights of the people are discernable
in almost every sentence of it.32
Jay’s understanding of equality was
not ours, and by “equal rights” he meant
that every member of the community
is equally entitled to the protection of
the law, not that everyone’s rights are
the same. But in one respect, Jay’s views
do not differ from ours: As he had written a few years before, he believed that
“all our inhabitants of every colour
and denomination [should] be free and
equal.”33 And because he believed that,
Jay had to recognize a glaring anomaly
in his account of the American constitutional order.
I left out a phrase from the Chisholm
passage I quoted; now let me restore
the missing words. Americans, Chief
Justice Jay asserted, “are truly the sovereigns of the country, but they are
sovereigns without subjects (unless
the African slaves among us may be
so called).” As Jay painfully recognized,
the existence of human chattel slavery in the United States contradicted
what he believed to be the fundamental premise of the Republic: that,
among its inhabitants, there can be

no subjects, “for in this country there
are none; [no one is] an inferior . . . for
all [“our inhabitants”] are, as to civil
rights, perfectly equal.”34 But no, not all
Americans were free or equal, and Jay
had no constitutional answer to that
ultimate contradiction: In Chisholm, he
simply acknowledged it.
Later constitutional lawyers cut the
Gordian knot. In 1806, Jackey Wright
and her daughter and granddaughter brought a suit for their freedom in
the Virginia Court of Chancery.35 The
Wrights claimed that they could prove
their direct descent from a Native
American ancestor and thus could not
be held as slaves under Virginia law.
Based on the evidence, Chancellor
George Wythe, a legendary figure in
founding-era American law, ruled in
their favor — and he gave a constitutional basis for his decision as well.
Article 1 of the Virginia Declaration
of Rights states that “all men are by
nature equally free and independent
and have certain inherent rights,”
including personal liberty. Under this
article, Wythe concluded that “freedom is the birth right of every human
being” in Virginia, and the burden of
proof lay on a would-be slaveholder to
prove with clear evidence his claim to
hold another person in bondage.36
Chancellor Wythe’s constitutional
holding left slavery legal on its face,
but nonetheless threatened to topple the institution one successful suit
for freedom after another, and it is
not surprising that the state court of
appeals rejected his article 1 reasoning while affirming his judgment on
the facts. One of the judges sitting on
the appeal was St. George Tucker, who
had serious anti-slavery credentials:
Three years earlier, he had published a
direct attack on the institution.37 But in
Hudgins v. Wright, Tucker denied that
slavery was inconsistent with Virginia
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constitutional law, however poorly it
fit with Virginia constitutional principle. According to Tucker,
the first clause of the Bill of Rights
. . . was meant to embrace the case
of free citizens, or aliens only; and
not by a side wind to overturn the
rights of property, and give freedom to those very people [who]
had no concern, agency or interest
[in “the revolution”].38
Slaves, in other words, might be
“people” but they were not part of our
people, the people for whom American
constitutions are made. In Jay’s terms,
slaves are among us, but Tucker
insisted, they are not of us. Tucker’s
reasoning defused the revolutionary
potential of constitutional language
about liberty and equality and quickly
became standard judicial fare; but
Tucker’s was not the only possible
answer to Jay’s dilemma.
Let’s now go to Raleigh: It’s December
1829. The North Carolina Supreme
Court has before it a case called State v.
Mann.39 Mann shot a slave named Lydia
whose services he had leased, and a jury
convicted him of a “cruel and unwarrantable” battery. State law was clear
that had he killed Lydia, Mann would
have been criminally liable, but she
survived the injury. Now the supreme
court had to decide what other limits
North Carolina law imposed on the use
of violence to impose a slaveholder’s
will. Defending the jury verdict, State
Attorney General Romulus Saunders
argued that the master/slave relation
was analogous to other asymmetrical legal relationships — parent/child,
master/apprentice, and so on — and
that in every case the law regulated
the relationship and required that the
person in authority act reasonably and
without unnecessary cruelty.40 The
court, however, concluded that state
law allowed the slaveholder to use any
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level of violence short of murder, and
left the task of justifying its decision to
its newest member, Thomas Ruffin, no
doubt with the expectation that Ruffin
would write an opinion sugar-coating
the harsh result. But for unknown reasons, Ruffin took a different tack.
Three drafts of his opinion survive.
The first fits the usual model followed
by opinions on the law of slavery: It’s
defensive, apologetic, intended to persuade the reader that the holding is a
just and appropriate balancing of “the
rights of the owner” with “the general
protection and comfort of the slave.”41
Over the next two drafts, however,
Ruffin systematically stripped away
most of the self-exculpatory language
and refashioned the opinion to deny
any claim that the court was upholding
something that could be called a right:
[I]t may well be asked, which power
of the master accords with right?
The answer will probably sweep
them all away. But we cannot look
at the matter in that light. The
truth is that we are forbidden to
enter upon a train of general reasoning on the subject. We cannot
allow the right of the master to be
brought into discussion in courts
of justice.42
Over 500 years earlier, Chief Justice
Bereford and his colleagues had begun
the process of subjecting the power
relationships of medieval England to
the power of legal reason. In 1829, Judge
Ruffin conceded that at the heart of
republican North Carolina, there was an
area of social life into which legal reason could not go, within which violence
was unchecked by law. While the legislature could, by an act of political will,
modify this reality, Ruffin denied the
competence of law to do so. “The difficulty is determining where a Court may
properly begin. . . . The Court, therefore, disclaims the power of changing
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ann’s
disavowal of
any power on
the part of the court
to protect [African
slaves] from harm
was an outright
confession that slavery
rendered American
constitutional law
incoherent.
the relation in which these parts of our
people stand to each other.”43
Wait! — did you hear that? These
parts of our people. In State v. Mann,
Ruffin resolved the ambiguity in Jay’s
words, “the African slaves among us,”
an ambiguity that Tucker and others
exploited by denying that slaves were
ever part of the American people or
entitled to the equal liberty our constitutions seek to protect. Ruffin denied
himself that easy excuse. Our people:
The African slaves among us are us, or
part of us, and Mann’s disavowal of any
power on the part of the court to protect those Americans from harm was
an outright confession that slavery
rendered American constitutional law
incoherent, a confession all the more
sweeping because its constitutional
dimension was almost invisible.
We’ve now come full circle, from
the promise of 1292 to the dead end of
1829. However powerful Ruffin’s merciless portrayal of slavery, his opinion
ended on a helpless note: In the face of
slavery, Marshall’s “great paramount
law of reason” was powerless.
In a sense, Ruffin was right: As a
matter of history the constitutional
self-contradiction of American slav- u

32

Vol. 103 No. 1

ery came to an end (to the extent it did)
only through political acts of will —
the Civil War and the Reconstruction
Amendments. But I want to suggest in
conclusion that Ruffin was also wrong,
not just morally wrong in his complicity
in radical injustice, but wrong in reaching so quickly the conclusion that law
was helpless in the face of that injustice. One of the most persistent themes
in the American constitutional law tradition has been our refusal to accept
too quickly a limit on the problems
“the artificiall Reason and judgment
of law” can address. That there are
such limits is also a theme in the tra-

dition, but, in identifying those limits, I
believe we should always question any
assumption, whether comfortable or
despairing, that constitutional law cannot address a social wrong.
Whether we have reached a limit
on the law’s domain is itself a critical and often difficult question of
constitutional law. At times, whatever
answer we give will fall short of geometric proof, and when that is so, the
assumptions, the preconceptions, and
the prejudices we bring to the question
may determine our answer. We are
responsible for our assumptions and
should be mindful of our prejudices.
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and should structure our decisions; it
cannot relieve us of the burden and the
privilege of responsible decision.
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